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Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality 
effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being 
offered and accepted are increased bribes are less likely to be offered and accepted. And 
when the game is presented as a bribery scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less 
likely to be offered and accepted. We discuss two possible reasons as to why our 
experiment leads to the identification of these effects while previous experiments did not. 
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Externality and framing effects in a bribery experiment  
 
1. Introduction 
This paper revisits two of the findings, or more specifically null findings, reported 
by Klaus Abbink and his coauthors in a series of experiments designed to explore bribery. 
Like the researchers themselves, we were surprised by these null findings and considered 
them worthy of further investigation.  
In 2002, Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Elke Renner (AIR below) conducted 
an experiment designed to explore the effects of three aspects of the environment in which 
bribes may be offered and accepted on such corrupt behavior. Those three aspects were (1) 
the fact that illegal agreements are not enforced by the rule of law, (2) that the exchange of 
bribes for corrupt services may be harmful to third parties or to society as a whole, and (3) 
that those engaged in such exchanges, if caught, may be severely punished. Their 
experiment involved a two-player, sequential game between a potential briber and bribee or 
‘public official’. Under the first of three treatments, the briber had to decide whether and 
how much to offer as a bribe without knowing whether the bribee would be willing to grant 
the briber a higher payoff (simulating the provision of the corrupt service being requested) 
in return and the bribee was free to reject the bribe, accept and grant the higher payoff, or 
accept but not grant the higher payoff. If bribes are offered and higher payoffs granted, it 
can be taken as evidence that trust and reciprocity are sufficient to support such exchanges. 
Under the second treatment, whenever a bribe was offered and a higher payoff granted by a 
briber-bribee pair all the other briber-bribee pairs attending the same experimental session 
incurred a loss, and the total loss incurred by all was greater than the sum of the briber and 
bribee’s private gains. If less bribery and less granting of higher payoffs is observed under 
this second as compared to the first treatment, it can be taken as evidence that individuals 
take account of the harm corrupt exchanges cause to others when deciding how to act. 
Finally, under the third treatment briber-bribee pairs engaging in corrupt exchanges faced a 
very small probability of loosing all their winnings from the experiment and being excluded 
from subsequent play. If there was less bribery and less granting of higher payoffs under 
this third as compared to the second treatment, it can be taken as evidence that individuals 
are deterred by punishment when contemplating bribery.  
AIR found evidence of trust and reciprocity between briber-bribee pairs and that the 
threat of punishment significantly reduced the incidence of corrupt exchanges. However,    4
they were surprised to find no evidence that individuals take account of the harm corrupt 
exchanges cause to others when deciding how to act.
1 
In the same year and as part of the same series of experiments Abbink and Heike 
Hennig-Schmidt (AHS below) investigated the possible impact of one further factor on 
briber and bribee behavior within the context of this game. AIR presented their games to 
their subjects in abstract form, being careful to never make the link between the experiment 
and corruption explicit. AHS repeated the same experiment except this time they presented 
the game as one in which a firm is applying for permission to run a factory that will pollute 
the environment and is deciding whether to offer the presiding public official a bribe. In 
turn, the public official must decide whether to accept or reject the bribe (if one is offered) 
and whether to grant the permission. Drawing on the discussions of Eckel and Grossman 
(1996) and Loomes (1999) AHS argued that ‘neutral instructions may distort the 
interpretability of experimental results with respect to the real-life situations researchers are 
interested in’ (AHS, p. 104) and suggested that by comparing behavior across the framed 
and unframed versions of the game we can identify the role played by ‘social and 
psychological factors’ (AHS, p. 104). They hypothesized that, as corruption is illegal and 
generally viewed as immoral, subjects receiving the framed presentation of the game would 
be less likely to offer and accept bribes and supply the corrupt service. However, they were 
surprised to find no significant effect.
2 
We are interested in re-examining these two null findings because, while one relates 
to a substantive treatment difference and the other to a methodological difference, both 
pertain to a particular question about the causes of corruption and to the corresponding 
policy debate. That question is as follows: does corruption occur whenever the extrinsic 
incentives are insufficient to keep individuals honest or do intrinsic motivations also play a 
determining role?  Intrinsic motivations can take many forms. However, in the context of 
corruption the most apposite would be social preferences that lead to dissatisfaction in the 
form of guilt when individuals view their own actions as leading to reduced welfare for 
others or simply as immoral. The comparison of AIR's first and second treatments can be 
seen as a direct test for the existence of the first of these two types of social preference, 
                                                 
1 Related null findings are reported in, as yet, unpublished papers. Abbink (2005) found no impact when 
reducing the relative initial endowments of innocent third parties who suffered losses when bribes were 
offered and accepted. And in a similar game applied to non-student subjects Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal, and 
Gangadharan (2005) found no impact when increasing the amount of harm caused to a third party when a 
bribe was offered and accepted.  
2 Subsequent bribery experiments have been framed with no attempts to investigate framing effects (see, for 
example, Cameron et al. (2005), Bilotkach (2006))     5
while AHS's experiment can be seen as a direct test for the existence of the second.  
Rather than replicating the experiments of AIR and AHS, we test for externality and 
framing effects using a much simpler bribery game. In our game, as in AIR’ and AHS's, a 
private agent has to decide whether and how much to offer a 'public official' as a bribe in 
exchange for a corrupt service (a higher payoff in the game) and in turn the 'public official' 
has to decide whether and how much to accept. However, in contrast to AIR and AHS, if a 
bribe is accepted the private agent automatically gets the corrupt service. Also in contrast to 
AIR and AHS but more in line with Abbink (2005) and Cameron et al. (2005), it is not 
other briber-bribee pairs that suffer a loss whenever a bribe is offered and accepted but a 
number of 'other members of society', i.e., other subjects who do not have the option to 
engage in bribery themselves. Further, in none of our treatments do corrupt pairs face a 
small probability of incurring a severe punishment. Instead, engaging in corruption is 
associated with a fixed cost representing the expected cost of being caught and punished 
plus, in the case of the 'public official', the cost of providing the service. Finally, we make 
two further simplifications and two other alterations for reasons that will become clear 
below: the bribe is not tripled before being passed on to the 'public official'; the game is 
one-shot not repeated; in the framed version of the game, the private agent is a ‘private 
citizen’ not a firm; and we apply the strategy method to the ‘public official’, asking would 
they accept or reject each of the possible bribes the ‘private citizen’ might offer.  
While AHS and AIR see their experiments as simulating corrupt exchanges between 
firms and public officials, ours is better viewed as simulating the corrupt exchanges that, in 
some countries, regularly take place between public officials and ordinary citizens 
endeavoring to avoid fines and court summonses, jump queues, or ascend waiting lists. In 
other words, it better simulates situations in which there is no reason to expect the bribers 
to be significantly richer than the bribees, the exchanges are one-shot or, at least, perceived 
as such by both bribers and bribees, and both sides of the exchanges are executed pretty 
much at the same time. Such exchanges are often referred to as 'petty corruption' suggesting 
that they may be of less importance than the type of corrupt exchanges to which AIR and 
AHS allude. However, we would argue that their relative importance depends not only on 
the magnitude of the benefits and costs involved but also on the frequency with which each 
type of exchange occurs and on how and whether they impact on the likelihood of other 
corrupt exchanges occurring or going unpunished. And, as long as these values, 
frequencies, and wider effects are unknown it is best to retain an open mind and an interest 
in research that might help identify ways of combating all types of corruption.     6
Our experiment provides evidence of both externality and framing effects and, 
thereby, suggests that intrinsic motivations do play a determining role in corruption.  
The paper has five sections. Following this introduction, in section 2, we describe 
our experimental design, present a number of behavioral predictions relating to different 
assumptions about intrinsic motivations or social preferences, and, with reference to these 
predictions, explain the treatments we apply. In section 3, we introduce our participants, 
and in section 4 we present our results. In section 5, we discuss our findings and provide 
some possible explanations as to why we have succeeded in identifying the two effects that 




2.1 The simple bribery game 
Each ‘private citizen’ receives an initial endowment, Yc, and may offer a ‘bribe’, b, 
in exchange for a corrupt service, the value of which to him is V. If he offers a bribe, 
regardless of its magnitude and whether it is accepted or rejected by the ‘public official’, he 
incurs a cost E. This represents the expected cost of being caught and punished. We chose 
to make this cost deterministic rather than stochastic in order to reduce the potential impact 
of risk preferences on observed behavior. So, the ‘private citizen’s’ final payoff from the 
game is:-  
Fc = Yc  if he chooses not to offer a bribe;  
 =  Yc – E + V– b  if he offers a bribe and the bribe is accepted; and 
 =  Yc – E  if he offers a bribe and the bribe is rejected. 
Each ‘public official’ receives an initial endowment of Yp. If he accepts a bribe he 
automatically has to supply the corrupt service and incur a cost, K.  This represents the sum 
of the expected cost of being caught and punished, the cost of supplying the service, and the 
cost of any efforts made to reduce the likelihood of capture. Again, we chose to make this 
cost deterministic rather than stochastic in order to reduce the potential impact of risk 
preferences on observed behavior. So, the ‘public official’s’ final payoff from the game is:-  
Fp = Yp  if he is not offered a bribe;  
 =  Yp  if he is offered but does not accept a bribe; and 
 =  Yp – K + b  if he accepts a bribe. 
Finally, each ‘other member of society’ receives an initial endowment of Yo and for    7
every bribe offered by a ‘private citizen’ and accepted by a ‘public official’ he incurs a cost, 
h. So, each ‘other member of society’s’ final payoff from the game is Fo= Yo – Nch, where 
Nc∈{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is the number of ‘private citizen’-‘public official’ pairs who offer and 
accept bribes. 
If all ‘public officials’ and ‘private citizens’ are selfish money-maximizers, and we 
treat play as sequential, this game has the following sub-game perfect equilibrium: each 
‘public official’ will accept any bribe that leaves him better off, i.e., he will accept any 
b>K, and will be indifferent between accepting and rejecting when b=K; assuming ‘private 
citizens’ know this, they will all offer bribes of K+μ , where μ  is a small positive amount; 
and all bribes (=K+μ ) will be accepted, so each ‘other member of society’ will suffer the 
maximum possible negative externality of 5h. We will refer to this as the selfish money 
maximizing equilibrium or SMME below.
3 
 
2.2 Predicting externality and framing effects with reference to social preferences 
One way of modeling the impact on behavior of social preferences of the type we 
described in the introduction is to assume that a ‘public official’ who causes harm to others 
or engages in an act that she perceives as immoral suffers a psychological cost, Mp=Mp(h,s) 
with Mp>0 if h>0, dMp/dh>0, dMp/ds>0, and where s captures the degree to which the act is 
perceived as immoral. Similarly, a ‘private citizen’ who causes harm to others or engages in 
an act that she perceives as immoral suffers a psychological cost, Mc=Mc(h,s) with Mc>0 if 
h>0,  dMc/dh>0,  dMc/ds>0. Now, leaving all other aspects of the game unchanged and 
assuming no other social preferences, we can make a number of predictions. 
 
Prediction 1. ‘Public  officials’  will now only accept b>K+Mp(h,s). So, an increase in 
either h or s will lead to an increase in ‘public officials’ minimum acceptable bribes.  
 
Prediction 2.   Any ‘public official’ for whom Mp(h,s)>bmax–K, where bmax is the maximum 
possible bribe in the game, will always reject. So, if Mp~F(.), over some range of h and s, 
the proportion of ‘public officials’ who reject all possible bribes, 1–F(bmax-K), will increase 
                                                 
3 Note that in AIR’ and AHS’s experiments the SMME involved no bribery because trust was a prerequisite to 
offering a bribe. In Cameron et al (2005) the SMME involved the maximum possible bribe because the value 
of the corrupt service increased proportionately with the bribe offered. By setting the SMME bribe at neither 
the minimum (zero) nor the maximum possible amount, we reduce the likelihood of our findings being 
spurious – based on participant errors alone.     8
following an increase in either h or s. 
 
Prediction 3.  A ‘private citizen’ who believes Mp~F ˆ (.) will offer no bribe if the net total 
private value of the corrupt service is insufficient to cover the sum of his own and his best 
guess of the ‘public official’s’ psychological costs, i.e., if Mc(h,s)+ p M ˆ (h,s)> E K V − − , 
where  p M ˆ  satisfies the first order condition  p M K V ˆ − − =F ˆ ( p M ˆ )/ f ˆ ( p M ˆ ). So, as long as 
d p M ˆ /dh = 0 and d p M ˆ /ds = 0 (reasonable assumptions that would apply in the case of most 
common probability distributions), an increase in either h or s will also lead to an increase 
in the proportion of ‘private citizens’ who choose not to bribe. 
 
Prediction 4.   If Mc(h,s)+ p M ˆ < V-K-E, the ‘private citizen’ will offer a bribe of K+ p M ˆ . So, 
if we assume that d p M ˆ /dh > 0 and d p M ˆ /ds > 0, an increase in h or s will lead to an 
increase in the bribes offered by ‘private citizens’. 
 
2.3 Parameterization and treatments 
In our experiment we used a fictitious currency called a Gilpet (G1 = £0.20 ˜ $0.35), 
set Yc=Yp=G35, Yo=G25, V=G16, E=G1, K=G5, and, for reasons that will be explained 
below, set h equal to either G1 or G4. ‘Private citizens’ could choose any b∈{G1, G2, 
G3,…G20} and recall that ‘public officials’, instead of responding only to the particular 
bribe offered to them by the ‘private citizen’ with whom they were paired, had to state 
whether they would accept or reject each of the possible bribes, b∈{G1, G2, G3,…G20}, 
while knowing that whichever one of their responses turned out to be pertinent would 
determine their earnings. This full strategy elicitation enabled us to identify ‘public 
officials’ who would reject any possible bribe and the minimum acceptable bribe for each 
of the others. 
Table 1: Experimental Design: Sessions and Treatments 





(negative externalities low) 
3 sessions 
(45 participants, 15 in each role) 
3 sessions 
(45 participants, 15 in each role) 
h=hH=G4 
(negative externalities high) 
3 sessions 
(45 participants, 15 in each role) 
4 sessions 
(60 participants, 20 in each role)    9
 
We varied both the magnitude of h, the negative externality caused by a bribe being 
offered and accepted, and, through framing, the likelihood that the acts of offering and 
accepting would be perceived as immoral, s, across experimental sessions. h was set either 
low, h=hL=G1, in which case bribery was Pareto-improving, or high, h=hH=G4, in which 
case bribery was Pareto-worsening. To set s=sL the game was explained in abstract terms: 
those taking the ‘private citizen’ role were referred to as ‘Player As’, those taking the 
‘public official’ role were referred to as ‘Player Bs’, ‘other members of society’ were 
referred to as ‘Player Cs’, bribes were simply referred to as ‘offers’, and no mention was 
made of corrupt services. And to set s=sH >sL the game was described using the labels 
‘private citizen’, ‘public official’, ‘other members of society’, and ‘bribe’. 
We conducted 13 experimental sessions each involving 15 participants. Table 1 
shows the distribution of sessions with respect to h and s.  
 
2.4 Practical details 
 All the experimental sessions took place during the final quarter of 2005 in seminar 
rooms in the Department of Economics, Oxford University. In every session the 
participants were seated at well spaced desks. The game was explained verbally by one of 
the authors (the same one in all sessions) following a predefined script and using visual aids 
in the form of overhead projector slides. Each participant received two tables showing how 
various possible decision combinations lead to particular final payoffs for each player-type. 
The participants expressed their decisions on specially designed forms which they 
completed behind privacy screens to ensure that they were not overlooked. No talking was 
allowed. Once the game was completed, the participants’ payoffs were calculated at the 
front of the seminar room and a show-up fee of £3 ($5.29) was added. In the meantime, the 
participants filled out a questionnaire. The experimental scripts can be found in Appendix 
1. (All the visual aids, tables, and forms designed for and used during the experiment are 
available from the authors.) 
 
3. Experimental participants 
Our 195 participants were all students at the University of Oxford. Some signed up 
for the study at a stall set up by us at the Annual Freshers’ Fare, an event at the start of each 
academic year designed to facilitate recruitment by student societies and other activity-   10
based groups. The remainder contacted us by e-mail having seen promotional posters and 
leaflets advertising the study or received an e-mail through their departmental or college 
mailing lists.  
Table 2 describes our participant sample, focusing on a few characteristics that have 
been found to be significant in previous analyses of other regarding behavior. Ages ranged 
from 18 to 44 years, with the average age being just under 24 years. Just over half of the 
students were female. All the major world religions were represented in the sample, 
although less than one third of the participants described themselves as religious. Fifteen 
percent were only children. Just under one third were studying economics. According to 
Chi-squared and t-tests, none of the characteristics vary significantly across assigned roles. 
However, despite the random assignment of participants, the participants under the high 
externality treatment were marginally but significantly older (24.40 as compared to 23.22 
years). 
Table 2: Participant characteristics 
All participants 'Private citizens' 'Public officials'
'Other members  
of society'
Average age in years 23.86 24.22 23.86 23.49
(4.46) (4.72) (4.33) (4.35)
Female 51.28% 49.23% 50.77% 53.85%
Described self as religious 29.74% 32.31% 33.85% 23.08%
An only child 15.38% 10.77% 20.00% 15.38%
Studying economics 28.21% 32.31% 33.85% 18.46%
Number of observations 195 65 65 65
 




The data generated by our experiment is presented in Figures 1 to 6 and Table 3. All 
the figures contain histograms showing, in the case of ‘private citizens’, the frequencies 
with which each of the possible bribes was offered and, in the case of ‘public officials’, the 
frequencies with which each of the possible minimum acceptable bribes was observed.  
Note that those offering or accepting no bribe have been placed at the right- rather than the 
left-hand end of their respective histograms. For ‘public officials’ this is because, given the 
math of the game, accepting no bribe implies a minimum acceptable bribe of 21 or more. 
So, by placing ‘no bribe’ on the right, we ensure that the total psychological cost implied by 
each possible decision increases as we move rightwards on the graph. We do the same for    11
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Figure 1: Bribes offered by ‘private citizens’ in the bribery game 
 
Figure 1 shows that of the ‘private citizens’ only 18 percent offered the SMME bribe of G6, 
while 76 percent offered a higher bribe or no bribe at all: 26 percent chose not to offer a 
bribe; 37 percent offered a bribe of G10, thereby dividing the net total private return to 
corruption equally between themselves and the ‘public official’; 1 percent made an offer of 
G11; and 10 percent made offers between G6 and G10. Only 6 percent made offers below 
the SMME, possibly in error. The strong mode at G10 is worthy of note: it is reminiscent of 
the oft seen modal offer of 50 percent in Ultimatum Games and suggests that preferences 
relating to fairness or reciprocal kindness may have affected the ‘private citizens’ behavior 
towards the ‘public officials’. While interesting, this pattern in the data cannot be taken as 
evidence of social preferences relating to engaging in acts that are immoral or cause harm 
to others. For that we must turn to the comparisons across treatments. 
    12
Table 3: Treatment effects in the bribery game 










h=G1 h=G4 s=sL s=sH
'Private Citizens'
Offered no bribe 26.15% 13.33% 37.14% 10.00% 40.00%
Observations 65 30 35 30 35
Chi-squared tests p-values
Mean bribe offered 8.04 7.50 8.68 7.62 8.57
Observations 48 26 22 27 21
t-tests (one tailed) p-values
rank-sum tests (two-tailed) p-values
'Public Servants'
Accepted no bribe 18.46% 6.67% 28.57% 10.00% 25.71%
Observations 65 30 35 30 35
Chi-squared tests p-values
Mean minimum acceptable bribe 7.54 7.39 7.72 7.74 7.34
Observations 53 28 25 27 26
t-tests (one tailed) p-values








In Figure 2 and the second and third columns of Table 3 the data on bribe offering 
has been separated according to the magnitude of the prevailing negative externality. In 
accordance with Prediction 3 (section 2.2 above), ‘Private citizens’ were significantly (5% 
level) less likely to offer bribes when the externality was high, i.e., when greater harm was 
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Figure 2: The effect of negative externalities on bribes offered    13
 
We also see an increase in the mean bribe offered, conditional on offering a bribe at 
all, when the negative externality was increased. This increase concurs with Prediction 4. 
However, it is only significant (10% level) according to a one tailed t-test, the power of 
which may be questionable given the non-normality of our data, and is not significant 
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Figure 3: The effect of framing on bribes offered 
 
In Figure 3 and the fourth and fifth columns of Table 3 the data on bribe offering 
has been separated according to whether the game was presented in abstract form (s=sL) or 
framed as a corrupt transaction (s=sH). Again, in accordance with Prediction 3, ‘private 
citizens’ were significantly (1% level) less likely to offer bribes when the corruption frame 
was applied, i.e., when the likelihood of the ‘private citizens’ perceiving the act they were 
contemplating as immoral was at its highest.  
The increase in the mean bribe offered, conditional on offering a bribe at all, when 
the game was framed as a corrupt exchange concurs with Prediction 4. However, it is only 
borderline significant (10.4% level) according to a one tailed t-test and is not significant 
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Figure 4: ‘Public officials’ minimum acceptable bribes in the bribery game 
 
Figure 4 presents a histogram of the ‘public officials’ minimum acceptable bribes 
(MABs). Forty percent of the ‘public officials’ would have accepted the SMME bribe of 
G6 and a further 6 percent would have accepted the break-even bribe of G5. In 
disagreement with the SMME, 18 percent would not accept any bribe, 11 percent chose a 
MAB of G10, 6 percent indicated MABs above G10, and 18 percent chose MABs between 
G6 and G10. Here, compared with the data on bribes offered, we see a weaker mode at the 
equitable division bribe of G10. This should come as no surprise to those familiar with 
Ultimatum Game experiments and does not rule out the possibility that some ‘public 
officials’ also preferred equitable final payoffs. Neither does it indicate anything about the 
impact of social preferences relating to engaging in acts that are immoral or harmful to 
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Figure 5: The effect of negative externalities on minimum acceptable bribes 
    15
In Figure 5 and the second and third columns of Table 3 the data on MABs has been 
divided into two sub-samples according to the magnitude of the prevailing negative 
externality. Consistent with Prediction 1 (section 2.2 above), ‘Public officials’ were 
significantly (5% level) more likely to reject all possible bribes when the externality was 
high, i.e., when greater harm was done to ‘other members of society’ when bribes were 
offered and accepted. The increase in the mean MAB, conditional on accepting at least one 
of the possible bribes, when the negative externality was increased concurs with Prediction 
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Figure 6: The effect of framing on minimum acceptable bribes 
 
In Figure 6 and the fourth and fifth columns of Table 3 the data on MABs has been 
separated according to whether the game was presented in abstract form (s=sL) or framed 
as a corrupt transaction (s=sH). The figures indicate that, in accordance with Prediction 1, 
‘Public officials’ were more likely to reject all bribes when the corruption frame was 
applied, i.e., when they were more likely to perceive the act they were contemplating as 
immoral. However, this result is only borderline significant (at 10.4%). Finally, the decline 
in the mean MAB, conditional on accepting at least the highest possible bribe, as we move 
from the abstract to the corruption frame, does not concur with Prediction 2, but is also not 
statistically significant. 
To check the robustness of our results, we conducted Probit analyses taking bribe 
offering and acceptance as the dependent variables and treatment dummies and the 
individual characteristics presented in Table 2 as independent variables. Controlling for 
individual characteristics did not significantly alter any of the findings reported above. The 
analyses are presented in Appendix 2.    16
 
5. Discussion 
In contrast to AIR, AHS, and indeed Cameron et al. (2005) and Abbink (2005), we 
find evidence of both an externality effect and a framing effect within the context of a 
bribery game. When each bribe offered and accepted does greater harm to a number of 
innocent third parties, subjects in the ‘private citizen’ role were significantly less likely to 
offer a bribe and subjects in the ‘public official’ role were significantly more likely to reject 
all possible bribes. And, when the game was framed as a situation in which a private citizen 
was considering offering a bribe to a public official in exchange for a corrupt service, 
subjects in the ‘private citizen’ role were, again, significantly less likely to offer a bribe and 
subjects in the ‘public official’ role were more likely to reject all possible bribes, although 
in this case the effect is only boarderline significant. These findings can be taken as 
evidence that intrinsic motivations, in the form of social preferences for not engaging in 
acts that cause harm to others or are perceived as immoral, may play a determining role in 
corruption.  
But why have we succeeded in identifying these effects when Abbink and others 
failed? Our experiments were not designed to address this question. However, our data does 
provide two clues that might be worth pursuing in future research. 
First, recall the strong mode in bribes offered at G10, the bribe that divides the net 
total private return to corruption equally between the briber and bribee. Had this mode been 
even stronger, it could have confounded our efforts to identify any of the effects of interest 
and would have indicated that concerns about acting fairly towards ones potential partner in 
crime were looming larger in the participants’ minds than concerns about harming others or 
doing something immoral. But working in our favor was the fact that concerns about acting 
fairly towards one’s partner in crime or having them act fairly towards oneself would have 
only affected the magnitude of the bribe offered or the minimum bribe accepted and not 
whether to offer or accept at least one of the possible bribes. Thus, our efforts to identify 
the predicted effects in the magnitudes of bribes offered and accepted may have been 
confounded, but our efforts to identify the predicted effects relating to the proportions of 
individuals engaging in bribery were not.  
Now recall AIR’s game in which trust and reciprocity between the briber and bribee 
were necessary preconditions to a corrupt exchange. Here, not only uncorrupt but also 
untrusting and untrustworthy individuals would be less likely to engage in bribery and this 
could have led to a confound if, as it would seem reasonable to hypothesize, untrusting and    17
untrustworthy individuals are also more rather than less inclined to be corrupt.
4 
Second, recall that in our experiment the framing effect on bribe offering was 
significant, while the framing effect on bribe acceptance was on the boarderline of 
insignificance. One possible explanation for this is that our subjects identified more readily 
with the role of ‘private citizen’ than with that of ‘public official’ and this affected the 
degree to which they saw the acts they were being asked to contemplate within the context 
of the experiment as immoral. Put another way, a subject may have felt it more excusable to 
accept a bribe while in the role of ‘public official’ precisely because they were role playing, 
while they may have felt it less excusable to offer a bribe while in the role of ‘private 
citizen’ because this is their role in everyday life – they were playing themselves and 
therefore more responsible for their actions. If this is the case, then AHS’s null finding may 
have been due to their choice of a frame in which both roles would have appeared alien to 
their subjects.   
 
6. Conclusion 
In contrast to other studies, our results suggest that intrinsic motivations may play a 
determining role in corruption and that public awareness and educational programs should 
not be excluded from the policymakers’ toolbox.  
Further, our findings lead us to concur with Eckel and Grossman (1996) and 
conclude that an experimental methodology can indeed be used to explore the role of 
context in determining behavior.  
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Appendix 1: Experimental Scripts  
Game description 
  The game you are each going to play involves 15 players, 5 Player As, 5 
Player Bs, and 5 Player Cs. Each one of you will play this game in the role of either Player 
A, Player B or Player C, with 14 other students. Each Player A is randomly matched with a 
Player B. However, no one will know exactly who is playing with whom.  
   I’m going to provide each player A and each Player B with 35 gilpets, and 
each Player C with 25 gilpets [put the transparency on]. Remember that gilpets represent 
our money in the game. Every Player A is matched with a Player B. The game proceeds as 
follows. First, every Player A can, if they choose, send some money to the Player B with 
whom he/she is playing. He can decide to send either nothing or between 1 gilpet and 20 
gilpets to Player B [I’ll point to the offer X on the transparency]. Second, every Player B 
has to decide whether to accept or reject the amount sent (if any) by the Player A he/she is 
playing with [I’ll write “A” and “R” using different colors on the transparency in 
correspondence of the dot representing Player B]. If Player A sends a positive amount and 
Player B rejects it [I point to the “R”], Player A gets 34 gilpets, whereas Player B keeps the 
initial 35 gilpets [I write 34 and 35 under the dots representing the 2 players using the 
same color I used for the letter “R”]. The payoffs of the Player Cs are not affected. 
   However, if Player A decides to send a positive amount, X and the Player B 
he/she is matched with decides t accept, Player A gets (50-X) gilpets and Player B gets 
“30+X”. Additionally, if a positive amount is sent and accepted, each Player C suffers a 
loss of 1 gilpet. If another Player A decides to send a positive amount, X and the Player B 
he/she is matched with decides t accept, [I point to another dot on the transparency and 
draw an arrow towards his Pl. B with the same “acceptance color”] each Player C suffers 
an additional loss of 1 gilpet [I write “–1” near the dots representing each Player C, using 
the same “acceptance color]. If all the player As decide to send a positive offer to their 
Player Bs, and all the Player Bs decide to accept [I draw arrows from all Pl.As to all Pl.Bs] 
each Player C suffers a total loss of 5 gilpet [I draw 3 more “-1” near the Pl.Cs dots]  
   So, each Player A has to decide whether or not to send a positive amount of 
money to their Player Bs [I write “S or NS” at the bottom of the transparency, in 
correspondence of Player As]. Each Player B has to decide whether to accept or reject a 
positive offer sent (if any) by their Player As [I write “A or R” at the bottom of the 
transparency, in correspondence of Player Bs]. Each Player C does nothing in this game, 
but he/she suffers a loss of 1 gilpet for any positive offer which is made by a Player A and    20
accepted by the Player B he/she is matched with. 
  Now, we are going to work through some examples. Look at the Table 1 that 
you have been given. It is the same as the one here on the board. It is designed to help you 
to decide how to play the game.  
   [Display the transparency of the table and, while talking through the 
examples, point to the relevant columns, rows, and cells in the table.] 
   First, I am going to explain how you should read the table. The first column 
on the left of the table shows you all the possible amounts of money that a Player A could 
send to a Player B. So, in this top row Player A is sending zero gilpets to Player B, and in 
this bottom row Player A is sending 20 gilpets to Player B. And all the other possible 
divisions are listed in order in between.  
   To the right of this first column, you have two sets of three columns. The 
first set of three shows you what happens to the payoffs of Player A, Player B and each 
Player C, if Player B decides to accept the amount sent by Player A. The second set of three 
shows you what happens to the payoffs of Player A, Player B and each Player C, if Player 
B decides to reject the amount sent by Player A. 
So, here are some examples [point to relevant cells as you go]: 
1.1.  Suppose Player A sends 1 gilpet to Player B. Then if Player B chooses to 
accept the offer, Player A will go home with 49 gilpets, Player B will go home with 31 
gilpets, and the earnings of each Player C will be reduced by 1 gilpet. If, instead, Player B 
decides to reject the offer, Player A goes home with 34 gilpets, Player B goes home with 35 
gilpets, and the earnings of each player C are not affected. 
1.2.  Here is another example. Suppose Player A sends 10 gilpets to Player B. 
Then if Player B chooses to accept the offer, Player A will go home with 25 gilpets, Player 
B will go home with 40 gilpets, and the earnings of each Player C will be reduced by 1 
gilpet. If, instead, Player B decides to reject the offer, Player A goes home with 34 gilpets, 
Player B goes home with 35 gilpets, and the earnings of each player C are not affected. 
 Does everyone see how to read the table? Shall I go through a few more examples? 
Let’s now look at the payoffs of each Player C. Please look at the “Table 2” on your 
desk. The first row of the table indicates the payoffs of each and every Player C when no 
offer has been made and accepted. The second row indicates 1 offer has been sent by a 
Player A and has been accepted by a Player B. The third row indicates the payoffs of each 
Player C when 2 offers have been sent by 2 Player As and have been accepted by the player 
Bs they are playing with, and so on and so forth. Therefore each Player C can earn from the    21
game a maximum of 25 gilpets, equal to their initial payoffs, if no offers have been made 
and accepted, and a minimum of 20 gilpets if 5 offers have been made and accepted. 
So, to summarize [put back on the transparency with the diagram]:- 
1)  Each Player A is given 35 gilpet and has to decide whether or not to send or 
not to send any positive amount of money, ranging from 1 to 20 gilpets, to the Player B 
they have been matched with: 
2)  Each Player B is given 35 gilpet has to decide whether to accept or reject 
any positive amount of money they have been sent by the Player As they have been 
matching with. 
3)  Player Cs are given 25 gilpet each and they do not do anything during the 
game. However, each and every Player C can suffer a monetary loss ranging from 1 to 5 
gilpet depending on the decisions made by each player A and each player B. 




Each one of you has now been given one or two white envelopes. Player As have 
been given two white envelopes stapled together, while Player Bs and Player Cs have been 
given one white envelope. I’m now going to explain first how Player As are going to play 
the game, secondly how Player Bs are going to play the game, and thirdly how Player Cs 
are going to play the game. 
Player As, as you can see one of the envelopes has your player number written on it. 
The other has no number on it and is empty. When I say, you will open the numbered 
envelope and you will find your initial payoff, equal to 35 gilpets, in it. Now listen 
carefully Player As. If you wish to send any amount of money between zero and 20 gilpets 
to Player B, you must put the money into the envelope with no number on it, leaving the 
envelopes stapled together. 
Now, Player Bs, you have received one white envelope. If you now open the 
envelope you will find a “Response Form” in the envelope. Put your name and player 
number on the top right corner of the form. Then answer every question on the form. 
Question 1 asks what you would do if Player A sends you 1 gilpet. Would you ‘accept so 
that you get 31 gilpets, player A gets 49 gilpets and the payoff of each Player c is reduced 
by 1 gilpet”? Or would you reject so that you get 35 gilpets, Player A gets 34 gilpets and 
the payoff of each Player c is not reduced by 1? You have to tick the box next to the option    22
you choose. Question 2 asks what you would do if Player A sends you 2 gilpets and again 
you have to tick the box next to the option you choose, and so on and so forth, until the last 
question which asks you what you would do if Player A sends you 20 gilpets. 
One of the responses you put on this form will determine your earnings, so think 
carefully when completing the forms. Later I will match your form with the offer made by 
the Player A you are paired with and do as you have indicated on the form. When you are 
finished answering the questions, please put the form back in the white envelope. 
Now, player Cs, you have been given one white envelope. When I say, you will 
open the envelope and you will find a piece of paper telling you the amount of gilpets you 
could earn from the game, depending of the actions of Player As and Player Bs. You are 
not going to be an active player in this game, but your earnings may be reduced, depending 
on the decisions made by Player As and Player Bs.  You should put the piece of paper back 
in the envelope just as you found it.  
So, is everyone clear? Does anyone have any questions? You can now open the 
white envelopes and play the game. 
[The white envelopes are gathered back in] 
While you fill in the questionnaires I’m going to compute your earnings. I will 
randomly match the envelopes and forms. Do the calculations in gilpets and then convert 
into GB pounds. You will receive your earnings once you have completed the 
questionnaire. Please show me your player number when you come collect your earnings. 
Does anyone have any questions?     23
Appendix 2: Probit analyses controlling for participant characteristics 
In the Probit analyses the dependent variables indicate that a bribe was offered in 
the case of the ‘private citizens’ and that at least one of the possible bribes was accepted in 
the case of the ‘public officials’.  
 
Table A2.1: Probit analysis of bribe offering 
 
Robust p values in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
  
Table A2.2: Probit analysis of bribe acceptance 
Dependent variable=1 if participant accepted a bribe 
 (1)  (2) 
h=h h (high negative externality)  -0.21*** -0.17** 
 [0.002]  [0.040] 
s=s h  (corruption frame)  -0.15* -0.16* 
 [0.066]  [0.063] 
Age   -0.01* 
   [0.073] 
Female   -0.03 
   [0.700] 
Religious person    -0.04 
   [0.674] 
Economic student    0.19* 
   [0.082] 
Only child    -0.04 
   [0.725] 
Observations 65  65 
Robust p values in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Dependent variable=1 if participant offered a bribe 
 (1)  (2) 
h=h h (high negative externality)  -0.22** -0.23** 
 [0.034]  [0.022] 
s=s h  (corruption frame)  -0.29** -0.28** 
 [0.015]  [0.022] 
Age   -0.00 
   [0.643] 
Female   -0.17 
   [0.252] 
Religious person    -0.10 
   [0.491] 
Economics student    -0.06 
   [0.583] 
Only child    -0.12 
   [0.350] 
Observations 65  65 